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Abstract 
About 40% of US corn is now used to produce biofuels, which are used as substitutes for 
gasoline in transportation. In this paper, we use a Ricardian model with differential land quality 
to show that world food prices rise by about 32% by 2022, about half of that from the biofuel 
mandate and the rest due to demand-side effects in the form of population growth and income-
induced changes in dietary preferences from cereals to meat and dairy products. However, 
aggregate world carbon emissions increase, due to significant land conversion to farming and 
leakage from lower oil prices.  
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I. Introduction  
Biofuels are providing an ever larger share of transport fuels, even though they have been 
universally attacked for not being a “green” alternative to gasoline. In the United States, about 
10% of gasoline now comes from corn and this share is expected to rise three-fold in the near 
future if the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) is extended. The European Union, India and China 
have aggressive biofuel mandates as well. Studies that have modeled the effect of these policies 
on food prices predict large increases, and have been supported by the run-up in commodity 
prices in recent years. For example, the International Food Policy Research Institute (Rosegrant 
et al.,2008) suggests that prices of certain crops may rise by up to 70% by 2020.
2
 
 
In this paper, we examine the long-run effects of US and EU biofuel policy in a dynamic, partial 
equilibrium setting.
3
 Our approach is unique in two respects. It is common knowledge that as 
poor countries develop, their diets change in fundamental ways. In particular, they eat less cereal 
and more animal protein in the form of meat and dairy products.
4
 This fact is important because 
producing meat and dairy uses more land than growing corn.
5
 Coupled with global increases in 
population, these demand shifts should cause an increase in food prices even without any biofuel 
policy. Second, many studies assume a fixed supply of land. There is plenty of land in the world, 
although of varying quality for food production. Sustained food price increases will cause new 
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 Other studies have also found a significant impact, although not to the same degree. For example, Roberts and 
Schlenker (2013) use weather-induced yield shocks to estimate the supply and demand for calories and conclude that 
energy mandates may trigger a rise in world food prices by 20-30%. Hausman, Auffhammer and Berck (2012) use 
structural vector auto-regression to examine the impact of biofuel production in the U.S. on corn prices. They find 
that one third of corn price increases during 2006-08 (which rose by 28%) can be attributed to the US biofuel 
mandate. Their short-run estimates are consistent with our prediction that in the long-run, the impacts may be 
significantly lower. This is because higher food prices are likely to trigger supply side responses only with a time lag, 
especially if significant land conversion were to occur. 
3
 Both have imposed large biofuel mandates. Other nations such as China and India have also announced biofuel 
mandates but their implementation is still in progress. We discuss them later in the paper.  
4
 For instance, aggregate meat consumption in China has increased 33 times in the last 50 years, yet its population 
has only doubled (Roberts and Schlenker 2013).  
5
 On average, eight kilos of cereals produce one kilo of beef and three kilos of cereals produce one kilo of pork. 
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land to be brought under farming, but as we move down the Ricardian land quality gradient, costs 
will rise, which may in turn put an upward pressure on prices.
6
 The model we develop in this 
paper explicitly accounts for the above effects in a dynamic setting where we allow for a rising 
supply curve of crude oil.
7
 
 
Fig.1 shows the disparity in meat and cereal consumption in the United States and China. 
Chinese per capita meat consumption is about half of the US, but cereal consumption is much 
higher. These gaps are expected to narrow significantly in the near future as the Chinese diet gets 
an increasing share of its calories from animal protein.
8
 Income-induced changes in dietary 
preferences have been largely ignored in previous economic studies. Our results show that about 
half the predicted rise in food prices may be due to changes in diet.   
 
 
(a) Cereal consumption  (b) Meat consumption 
Figure 1: Per capita cereal and meat consumption in China and US, 1965-2007 
Source: FAOSTAT. Note: Chinese cereal consumption excludes grain converted to meat. 
                                                 
6
 Significant amounts of new land is currently being converted for farming (Tyner, 2012). 
7
 Hertel, Tyner and Birur (2010) use a general equilibrium trade model (GTAP) to explore the impact of biofuels 
production on world agricultural markets, specifically focusing on US/EU mandatory blending and its effects on 
individual countries. They use disaggregated data on world land quality. However, their static framework does not 
account for changes in food preferences. Reilly and Paltsev (2009) also develop a static energy model that does not 
account for heterogeneity in land quality.  
 
8
 Although we use China as an example, the trend holds for other countries as well. For example, per capita meat 
and dairy consumption in developed nations is about four times higher than in developing countries. 
3 
 
Since our main premise is that the pressure on food prices will lead to more land conversion, the 
model we propose explicitly accounts for the distribution of land by quality. We use data from 
the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) which classifies land by soil quality, location, 
production cost and current use as in pasture or forest. With increased use of biofuels, oil prices 
will fall, which will lead to leakage in the form of higher oil use by countries with no biofuel 
policy. We endogenously determine the world price of crude oil and the extent of this spatial 
leakage.
9
 We show that biofuel policy may reduce direct carbon emissions (from combustion of 
fossil fuels) in the mandating countries but it is largely offset by an increase in emissions 
elsewhere. However, indirect emissions (from land use) go up because of the conversion of 
pasture and forest land, mainly in the developing countries. Aggregate global greenhouse gas 
emissions from the US and EU biofuel mandates actually show a small increase.  
 
The main message of the paper is that demand shifts may have as much of a role in the rise of 
food prices as biofuel policy.
10
 Moreover, this price increase may be significantly lower because 
of supply side adjustments in the form of an increase in the extensive margin. We obtain these 
results with assumptions of modest growth rates in the productivity of land and in the energy 
sector. General equilibrium effects of these policies, which we do not consider, may further 
diminish the price impact of biofuel mandates. By the same token, models that do not account for 
supply side effects of rising food prices will tend to find large impacts.     
                                                 
9
 Unlike other studies that determine crude oil use in a static setting.  
10
 Additional biofuel mandates imposed by China and India also have a surprisingly small effect on food prices.  
 
 
4 
 
Section 2 describes the underlying theoretical model. Section 3 reports the data used in the 
calibration. Section 4 reports results and in section 5 we discuss sensitivity analysis. Section 6 
concludes the paper. The Appendix provides data on the parameters used in the model. 
 
II. The Model 
In this section, we present the detailed theoretical structure of the calibration model used to 
estimate food prices.  Consider a dynamic, partial equilibrium economy in which three goods, 
namely cereals, meat and transport energy are produced and consumed in five regions 
respectively denoted by r  (the United States, EU, other High Income Countries, Medium Income 
Countries and Low Income Countries).
 
Time is denoted by subscript t . The regional 
consumption of these goods is denoted by ( ), ( )rc rmq t q t  
and ( )req t  where mc,  and e denote 
cereals, meat and energy, respectively. Each region faces a downward-sloping inverse demand 
function denoted by 1 1( ( ), ), ( ( ), )rc rc rm rmD q t t D q t t
  and 1( ( ), )re reD q t t
 , respectively. Within each 
region, demand for a good is independent of the demand for other goods. Regional demands for 
the three consumption goods (cereals, meat and transport energy) are modeled by means of Cobb-
Douglas demand functions, which shift exogenously over time because of changes in population, 
income and consumer preferences over meat and cereals. Benefits from consumption are 
measured in dollars by the Marshallian surplus, i.e., the area under the inverse demand curve.
11
  
Land is used to supply food and biofuels. It is available in three qualities denoted by 
 ,  ,  n High Medium Low  with High being the highest quality. The acreage of land quality n  in 
                                                 
11
 The structure of the model is similar to that adopted by Chakravorty, Roumasset and Tse (1997) for a single 
region, and by other studies as well (e.g., Sohngen, Mendelsohn and Sedjo (1999), Fischer and Newell (2008) and 
Crago and Khanna (2014)). Nordhaus (1973) pioneered this approach by assuming independent demand functions 
for the US transport, commercial and residential energy sectors. 
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region r  devoted to cereals, meat or biofuel production at any time t is given by ( ), ( )n nrc rmL t L t and 
by ( )nrbL t , respectively, where we denote the different land uses by  , ,j c m b .  Let ( )
n
rj
j
L t  be 
the total acreage in use j  for land quality n  at any time t and 
n
rL  be the initial land area by 
quality available for cultivation. Aggregate land under the three crops cannot exceed the 
endowment of land, hence ( ) ( ) , for all .
nn n
rrj r
j
L t L t L j   Let new land brought under cultivation 
at any time t  be denoted by ( ),nrl t  i.e., , where dot denotes the time derivative. The 
variable ( )nrl t may be negative if land is taken out of production: here we only allow new land to 
be brought under cultivation.
12
 The regional total cost of bringing new land into cultivation is 
increasing and convex as a function of aggregate land cultivated in the region, but linear in the 
amount of new land used at any given instant – this cost is given by ( )n nr r rc L l  where we assume 
that 
2
2
0, 0.r r
n n
r r
c c
L L
 
 
 
 Additional land brought under production is likely to be located in remote 
locations. Thus, the greater is the land area already under cultivation, the higher the unit cost of 
bringing new land into farming within a given quality.  
Let the yield for land quality n  allocated to use j  be given by .nrjk
13
 Yields are higher on higher 
quality land.
14
 Then the output of food or biofuel energy at any time t  is given by 
n n
rj rj
n
k L . 
                                                 
12
 Allowing land to be taken out of production will make the optimization program complicated. When we run our 
calibration model, this variable is never zero before the year 2100 except in the US (where land conversion is small 
in any case, as we see later in the paper) and is never zero in any region after the year 2100 because population keeps 
increasing and diets trend toward more meat and dairy consumption, which is land intensive. However, if food prices 
fall because of exogenous technological change, some land may go out of production in the distant future, but that is 
beyond the scope of our analysis.  
13
 In the calibration model, crops are transformed into end-use commodities (cereals, meat and biofuels) by means of 
a coefficient of transformation (crops into commodities) and a cost of transformation, both linear. Their values are 
reported in the Appendix.  
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Regional production costs are a function of output and assumed to be rising and convex, i.e., 
more area under cereals, meat or biofuel production implies a higher cost of production, given by 
( ).n nrj rj rj
n
w k L  
Oil is a nonrenewable resource and we assume a single integrated “bathtub” world oil market as 
in Nordhaus (2009). Let X  be the initial world stock of oil that is used only for transportation, 
)(tX be the cumulative stock of oil extracted until date t  and ( )rx t  the regional rate of 
consumption so that  . The unit extraction cost of oil is increasing and convex 
with the cumulative amount of oil extracted, denoted by )(Xg . Thus total cost of extraction 
is ( ) ( )r
r
g X x t . Crude oil is transformed into gasoline by applying a coefficient of 
transformation 
r  so that total production of gasoline is gr r rq x , where ' 'g  stands for 
gasoline.
15
 Transport fuel is produced from combining gasoline (derived from crude oil) and 
biofuels in a convex linear combination using a CES specification, given by 
1 1 1
(1 )
r
r r r
r r
re r rg rg rg rbq q q

  
   
   
   
  
 where 
req is the production of transport fuel, r is a 
constant, ,rg rbq q the quantities consumed of gasoline and biofuel, rg is the share of oil and 
(1 )rg  is the share of biofuels in transport fuel, r  is the regional elasticity of substitution. 
 
We assume frictionless trade of food commodities and biofuels across regions. Then we can write 
the net export demand (regional production net of consumption) for cereals, meat and biofuels as    
                                                                                                                                                              
14
 See Appendix Tables A5 and A6.   
15
 We include the cost of refining crude oil into gasoline, described in the Appendix. 
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,n n n nrc rc rc rm rm rm
n n
k L q k L q
   
    
   
   and ,n nrb rb rb
n
k L q
 
 
 
  respectively. Transport fuel is not 
traded but blended and consumed domestically.  
 
Given the exogenous shift in demand from population growth and changes in preferences over 
meat and cereals driven by an increase in GDP per capita, the social planner maximizes net 
discounted surplus across regions and over time using a discount rate 0  . (S)he chooses the 
regional acreage allocated to food and biofuel production, the amount of new land brought under 
cultivation, the quantity of each food and energy used and the quantity of gasoline used at each 
time t  in each region r . Note that we do not include the externality cost of carbon emissions 
from energy or land use in this program. Later, we exogenously impose the mandates on biofuel 
production by region (the US and the EU) and solve for the constrained solution.
16
 The 
optimization problem is written as  
1
, , ,
0 0
( , t) ( ) ( ) ( )    (1)
rj
r r r r
nj j n
q
t n n n n r
rj rj rj r r r rj rj rj
L q l x
r n j n r
Max e D q dq c L l w k L g X x dt

 
    
           
       
subject to: 
 
                                                 
16
 In both the unconstrained and constrained models, we compute the aggregate carbon emissions from each 
program. 
 
8 
 
where 
rg r rq x . The corresponding generalized Lagrangian can be written as: 
1
0
( , t) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
rjq
n n n n
rj rj rj r r r rj rj rj
r n j n
r n n n n n
r r rj r r r
r r n j r
n n
j rj rj rj
j r n
L D q dq c L l w k L
g X x L L l x
k L q
  


 
   
 
 
 
     
 
   
    
   
   
   
  
 
where n
r is the multiplier associated with the static land constraint (2), 
n
r and  are multipliers 
associated with the two dynamic equations (3) and (4), and j represents the world price of  
traded goods (cereals, meat and biofuels). We get the following first order conditions: 
 
 
 
( ') 0( 0if 0), , ,                                                                    
(7)
0( 0if 0), ,                                                                   
n n n
rj j rj r rj
rj j rj
k w L j c m b
p q j c m
 

     
                           (8)                                                            
0( 0if 0)                                                                                        rere b rb
rb
q
p q
q


   

            
(9)
( ) 0( 0if 0)                                                                                                  
(10)
( ) 0( 0if 0).                           
n n
r r r rn
re
re rg
rg
c L l
q
p g X q
q


   

    

                                                        
(11)
 
Finally, the dynamics of the co-state variables is given as 
 
This is a standard optimization problem with a concave objective function since the demand 
functions are downward sloping and costs are linear or convex. The constraints are linear. We can 
thus obtain a unique, interior solution.
17
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 For an analytical solution to a much simpler but similar problem, see Chakravorty, Magne and Moreaux (2008).  
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Conditions (7) suggest that the cultivated land in each region is allocated either to cereals, meat 
and energy production until the price (n j ) 
equals the sum of the production cost plus the shadow 
value of the land constraint, given by .nr  Equation (8) suggests that the regional price of cereals 
and meat ( )rjp  
equals its world price (n j ). Equation (9) suggests that the price of biofuels in each 
region ( )rep , weighted by the term 
re
rb
q
q
 
 
 
 equals its world price )( b . Equation (10) indicates 
that the marginal cost of land conversion equals the dynamic shadow value of the stock of land 
.rn  Equation (11) states that the regional price of gasoline ( )rep  weighted by 
re
rg
q
q
 
   
 equals its 
cost augmented by the scarcity rent  . Conditions (12) and (13) give the dynamic path of the two 
co-state variables  and .nr   
According to equations (9) and (11), consumption of biofuel and gasoline are respectively given 
by '
n
re r
re rb n
rb rb
q
p w
q k

 

 and ( ) .rere
rg
q
p g X
q


 

 Hence the weighted marginal costs of biofuels 
and gasoline are equal. A positive quantity of land is allocated to the production of cereals, meat 
and energy. Obviously, rents will be higher on higher quality land. An increase in the demand for 
energy will induce a shift of acreage from food to energy and hence drive up the price of food, as 
well as bring more land into cultivation, potentially of a lower quality. 
The biofuel mandate is imposed in the model by requiring a minimum level of consumption of 
biofuels in transportation at each date until the year 2022. Define the regional mandate in time T  
as ( )
rb
q T , which implies that biofuel use must not be lower than this level at date .T  This 
constraint can be written as  ( ) ( ) 0.rb rbq T q T   This will lead to an additional term 
10 
 
 ( ) ( )r rb rbq T q T  in the generalized Lagrangian. The new condition for allocating land to 
biofuel (modified equations (7) and (9)) will 
be ' 0,( 0if 0) for all .n n nrerb re rb r r rb
rb
q
k p w L n
q
 
 
      
 
 The shadow price 
r can be 
interpreted as the implicit subsidy to biofuels that bridges the gap between the marginal costs of 
gasoline and biofuel. It is of course region-specific. The European mandate is a proportional 
measure, which prescribes a minimum percent of biofuel in the transport fuel mix. This 
restriction is implemented in the model by writing 
( )
( )
( )
rb
re
q T
s T
q T
 where )(Ts is the mandated 
minimum share of biofuels in transport at time T .  
Even though the optimization program abstracts from valuing externalities from carbon 
emissions, it is important to find out whether carbon emissions decline due to the imposition of 
the biofuel mandate.
18
 The model tracks direct as well as indirect carbon emissions. Emissions 
from gasoline are constant across regions, but emissions from first and second gen biofuels are 
region-specific and depend upon the crop used. Emissions from gasoline occur at the 
consumption stage, while biofuel emissions occur mainly at the production stage. Finally, 
indirect carbon emissions are released by conversion of new land, namely forests and grasslands 
into food or energy crops. This sequestered carbon is released back into the atmosphere. In the 
Appendix we detail the assumptions used to compute regional carbon emissions with and without 
the biofuel mandate.  
 
                                                 
18
 Chakravorty and Hubert (2013) analyze the impact of a carbon tax on the transportation sector in the US.  
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III. Calibration of the Model 
In this section, we discuss calibration of the model presented above. We aggregate the countries 
into three groups as stated earlier, using data on gross national product per capita (World Bank 
2010). These are High, Medium and Low Income Countries (HICs, MICs and LICs). Since our 
study focuses specifically on US and EU biofuel mandates, the HICs are further divided into 
three groups - the US, EU and Other HICs. There are five regions in all. Table 1 shows average 
per capita income by region. The MICs consist of fast growing economies such as China and 
India that are likely to account for a significant share of future world energy demand as well as 
large biofuel producers like Brazil, Indonesia and Malaysia. The LICs are mainly nations from 
Africa.  
Table 1. Classification of regions by income (US$) 
Regions         GDP per capita Major countries 
US                 46,405 - 
EU        30,741 - 
Other HICs                 36,240 Canada, Japan  
MICs         5,708 China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia 
LICs          1,061 Mostly African countries 
Notes: Per capita GDP in 2007 dollars, PPP adjusted. Source: World Bank (2010) 
 
Specification of Demand. We can now describe the three consumption goods - cereals, meat and 
dairy products, and transport energy - in more detail. Cereals include all grains, starches, sugar 
and sweeteners and oil crops. Meat and dairy include all meat products and dairy such as milk 
and butter. For convenience, we call this group “meat.” We separate cereals from meat because 
their demands are subject to exogenous income shocks as specified below. Meat production is 
also more land intensive than cereals. As mentioned above, transport energy is supplied by 
12 
 
gasoline and biofuels. Cereals, meat and biofuels compete for land that is already under farming 
as well as new land, which is currently under grassland or forest cover.
19
  
 
Regional demand ( , )rj rjD P t  for good j  takes the form                                  
 
 
D
rj
(P
rj
,t) = A
rj
P
rj
arj y
r
(t)
brj (t ) N
r
(t)        (14) 
where ( )rjP t  
is the output price of good j at time t  in dollars,
 
a
rj
is the regional own-price 
elasticity and ( )rj t  the regional income elasticity for good j which varies exogenously with per 
capita income reflecting changes in food preferences; ( )ry t  
is regional per capita income, ( )rN t  
is regional population at time t  and rjA  is the constant demand parameter for good j , which we 
calibrate to reproduce the base-year demand for final commodities for each region. The constant 
demand parameters are reported in Appendix Table A1.
20
 The demand function in (14) can be 
thought of as the demand for a representative individual times the population of the region. 
Individual demand is a function of the price of the good and income given by GDP per capita.  
 
As incomes rise, we expect to observe increased per capita consumption of meat relative to the 
consumption of cereals, as noted in numerous studies (e.g., Keyzer et al. 2007). We model this 
shift towards animal protein by using income elasticities for food that are higher at lower levels 
of per capita income.  Specifically, income elasticities for the US, EU and other HICs are taken to 
be stationary in the model since dietary preferences as well as income in these regions are not 
expected to change significantly over time, at least relative to developing countries. However, 
                                                 
19
 Obviously, many other commodities can be included for a more disaggregated analysis, but we want to keep the 
model tractable so that the effects of biofuel policy on land use are transparent. 
20
 Independence of demand for meat and cereals has been assumed in other studies, see Rosegrant et al. (2001) and 
Hertel, Tyner and Birur (2010). 
13 
 
they are likely to vary in the MICs and LICs due to the larger increase in per capita incomes. The 
higher the income, the lower is the income elasticity. All price and income elasticities are specific 
to each food commodity (e.g., meat, cereals) and taken from GTAP (Hertel et al., 2008) as 
described in the Appendix (Tables A1-A3).
21
 
 
We account for regional disparities in the growth of population. While the population of high 
income nations (including the US and EU) is expected to be fairly stable over the next century, 
that of middle income countries is predicted to rise by about 40% by 2050 and more than double 
for lower income countries (United Nations Population Division, 2010). Demand is also impacted 
by per capita income in each region, which is assumed to increase steadily over time but at a 
decreasing rate, as in several studies (e.g., Nordhaus and Boyer 2000). Again, regional 
differences are recognized, with the highest growth rates in MICs and LICs.
22
 
 
Land Endowment and Productivity. The initial global endowment of agricultural land is 1.5 
billion hectares (FAOSTAT). The regional distribution of land quality is not even, as is evident 
from Figure 2, which shows land endowments based on climate and soil characteristics.23 Most 
good land is located in higher income countries, but Brazil and India also have sizeable 
                                                 
21
 Note that not all developing countries have exhibited as large a growth in meat consumption as China. For 
example, a third of Indians are vegetarian and a change in their incomes may not lead to dietary effects of the same 
magnitude. Moreover, beef and pork are more land-intensive than chicken, the latter being more popular in countries 
like India. The distribution of income may also affect this behavior. If it is regressive, the effect on diets may be 
limited.    
22
 Initial population levels and projections for future growth are taken from the United Nations Population Division 
(2010). Both world food and energy demands are expected to grow significantly until about 2050, especially in the 
MICs and LICs. By 2050, the current population of 6.8 billion people is predicted to reach nine billion. Beyond that 
time, population growth is expected to slow, with a net increase of one billion people between 2050 and 2100. 
23
 Many factors such as irrigation and climate change can affect land quality. For instance, investment in irrigation 
can improve the productivity of land. In northern regions like Canada and Russia higher temperatures may cause an 
expansion of land suitable for agricultural production; hence, area under medium and low qualities may increase in 
the future. The net effect of these factors on the productivity of new land is unclear and left for future work. 
However, we do allow for increasing productivity of land over time (see below).              
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endowments of high quality land. Initial endowment for each of the three land qualities can be 
divided into land already under cultivation and fallow land.
 24
 As shown in Table 2, more than 
half of the agricultural land in the HICs (US, EU and Others) is classified as high quality, while 
the corresponding shares are roughly a third for MICs and LICs, respectively. Most land of 
medium and low quality is currently fallow in the form of grasslands and forests, and located in 
MICs and LICs. Note from Table 2 that there is no high quality land available for new 
production. Future expansion must occur only on lower quality lands. Brazil alone has 25% of all 
available lands in the MICs and is the biggest producer of biofuels after the US. 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of land quality 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, (Eswaran et al. 2003 p.121). Notes: Land quality is defined along two 
dimensions: soil performance and soil resilience. Soil performance refers to the suitability of soil for agricultural 
production; soil resilience is the ability of land to recover from a state of degradation. Land quality 1 is the highest 
quality and 9 the lowest. In our model, we ignore category 7 through 9 which are unsuitable for agricultural 
production and aggregate the rest into three qualities (categories 1 and 2 become High quality land, 2 and 3 Medium 
quality land and 5 and 6, Low quality land). 
 
As in Gouel and Hertel (2006), the unit cost of accessing new land in a region increases with land 
conversion. This can be written as  
                                                 
24
 See Appendix for details on land classification. According to FAO (2008a), an additional 1.5 billion hectares of 
fallow lands could be brought under crop production in the future. This is approximately equal to the total land area 
already under cultivation. 
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where n
rL is the initial endowment of quality n, so that ( )
n n
r rL L t   is the fallow land available at 
date t, 
 
f
1r
and 
 
f
2r
are model parameters, positive in value (calibrated from data) and assumed to 
be the same across land quality but varying by region (see Appendix Table A4).
25
  
 
Table 2. Land currently in farming and endowment of fallow land 
 Land quality US EU Other HICs MICs LICs World 
Land already under 
Agriculture 
(million ha) 
High 100 100 25 300 150 675 
Medium 48 32 20 250 250 590 
Low 30 11 20 243 44 350 
Land available for 
farming (incl. fallow 
lands)  
(million
 
ha) 
High 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Medium 11 8 21 300 300 640 
Low 11 8 21 500 500 1040 
Sources: Eswaran et al. (2003), FAO (2008a), Fischer and Shah (2010).    
 
 
Improvements in agricultural productivity are exogenous and allowed to vary by region and land 
quality (see Appendix Table A5). All regions are assumed to exhibit increasing productivity over 
time, mainly because of the adoption of biotechnology (e.g., high-yielding crop varieties), access 
to irrigation and pest management. However, the rate of technical progress is higher in MICs and 
LICs because their current yields, conditional on land quality, are low due to a lag in adopting 
modern farming practices (FAO 2008a). The rate of technical progress is also likely to be lower 
for the lowest land quality. Biophysical limitations such as topography and climate reduce the 
efficiency of high-yielding technologies and tend to slow their adoption in low quality lands, as 
pointed out by Fischer et al. (2002).  
                                                 
25
 Intuitively, 
 
f
1r
is the cost of converting the first unit land to farming. Conversion costs increase without bound as 
the stock of fallow land declines, since the log of the bracketed term is negative.  
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The production cost for product j  (e.g. cereal, meat or biofuel) for a given region is 
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where the term inside brackets is the aggregate production over all land qualities in the region 
and 
1r and 2r are regional cost parameters.
26
 For food and biofuels, we distinguish between 
production and processing costs. All crops need to be packaged and processed, and if they are 
converted to biofuels, the refining costs are significant. For cereals and meat, we use the GTAP 5 
database, which provides sectoral processing costs by country (see Appendix Table A7). 
Processing costs for biofuels are discussed below.   
 
The Energy Sector. Transportation energy eq is produced from gasoline and biofuels in a convex 
linear combination using a CES specification. For biofuels we model both land using (First 
Generation biofuels) and newer technologies that are less land-using (Second Generation), the 
latter are described in more detail below. First and second generation biofuels are treated as 
perfect substitutes, but with different unit costs, as in many other studies (Chen et al. 2012).  We 
use estimates of the elasticity of substitution made by Hertel, Tyner and Byrur (2010). We 
calibrate the constant parameter in the CES production function to reproduce the base-year 
production of blending fuel (see Appendix Table A8 for details).
27
  
 
For crude oil reserves, both conventional and unconventional oils (e.g., shale) are included. 
According to IEA (2011), around 60% of crude oil is used by the transportation sector. From the 
                                                 
26
 The calibration procedure for this equation is explained in the Appendix and regional cost parameters are reported 
in Table A6.  
27
 Transport fuel production is in billion gallons, which is transformed into Vehicles Miles Traveled (VMT) using the 
coefficients reported in Table A9. 
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estimated oil reserves in 2010, we compute the initial stock of oil available for transportation as 
153 trillion gallons (3.6 trillion barrels, World Energy Council 2010). The unit cost of oil 
depends on the cumulative quantity of oil extracted (as in Nordhaus and Boyer 2000) and can be 
written as 
3
1 2
( )
g( ( ))
X t
X t
X

 
 
   
 
                           (17) 
where 
t r
r txtX )()(  is the cumulative oil extracted at time t , X is the initial stock of crude 
oil, 1 is the initial extraction cost and 1 2( )  is the unit cost of extraction of the last unit of oil. 
The parameters 1 , 2 and 3  are obtained from Chakravorty et al. (2012). The initial extraction 
cost of oil is around $20 per barrel (or $0.50 per gallon) and costs can rise to $260 per barrel (or 
$6.50 per gallon) close to exhaustion (see Appendix Table A10). At these high prices, 
unconventional oils become competitive.  
 
For each region, we consider a representative fuel: gasoline for the US and diesel for the EU.
28
 
We further simplify by considering a representative first generation biofuel for each region. This 
assumption is reasonable because there is only one type of biofuel that dominates in each region. 
For example, 94% of biofuel production in the US is ethanol from corn, while 76% of EU 
production is biodiesel from rapeseed. Brazil, the largest ethanol producer among MICs, uses 
sugarcane. Hence, sugarcane is used as the representative crop for MICs. In the LICs, 90% of 
biofuels are produced from cassava, although it amounts to less than 1% of global production.
29
 
Table 3 shows the representative crop for each region and its processing cost in the model base 
                                                 
28
 Gasoline represents more than three-quarters of US transport fuel use while diesel accounts for about 60% in the 
EU (World Resources Institute 2010). The coefficients of transformation of oil into gasoline and into diesel are 
reported in the Appendix. 
29
 Energy yield data for first-generation biofuels is reported in Appendix Table A11.  
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year.
30
 Note the significant difference in costs across crops. These costs are assumed to decline 
by around 1% a year (Hamelinck and Faaij 2006) mainly due to a decrease in processing costs.
31
  
 
Table 3. Unit processing costs of first generation biofuels 
 US EU Other HICs MICs LICs
 
Feedstock Corn Rapeseed
 
Corn Sugar-cane Cassava 
 (94%) (76%) (96%) (84%) (99%) 
Cost ($/gallon) 1.01 1.55 1.10 0.94 1.30 
Sources: FAO (2008a); Eisentraut (2010); Notes: The numbers in parentheses represent the percentage of first-
generation biofuels produced from the representative crop in the base year, 2007 (e.g., corn). 
 
We model a US tax credit of 46 cents/gallon, consisting of both state and federal credits (de 
Gorter and Just 2010), which is removed from the model in year 2010, as done in other studies 
(Chen et al. 2012).  EU states have tax credits on biodiesel ranging from 41-81 cents (Kojima et 
al. 2007). We include an average tax credit of 60 cents for the EU as a whole.  
 
Second gen biofuels can be divided into three categories depending on the fuel source: crops, 
agricultural and non-agricultural residue. They currently account for only about 0.1% of total 
biofuel production although the market share may increase with a reduction in costs and 
improved fuel performance and reliability of the conversion process. Compared to first gen fuels, 
they emit less greenhouse gases and are less land consuming.
 
Among several second gen 
biofuels, we model the one that has the highest potential to be commercially viable in the near 
future, namely cellulosic ethanol (from miscanthus, which is a type of perennial grass that 
produces biofuel) in the US and biomass-to-liquid (BTL) fuel in the EU (IEA 2009b). Their 
                                                 
30
 The total cost of biofuels is the sum of the production and processing costs plus rent to land net the value of by-
products. Note that production costs depend on what type of land is being used and in which geographical region, 
and land rent is endogenous. By-products may have significant value since only part of the plant (the fruit or the 
grain) is used to produce first-generation biofuels. For instance, crushed bean “cake” (animal feed) and glycerine are 
by-products of biodiesel that can be sold separately. The costs shown in table represent about 50% of the total cost of 
production. 
31
 Except for cassava, for which we have no data. 
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energy yields are much higher than for first gen biofuels. In the US, 800 gallons of ethanol (first 
gen) are obtained by cultivating one hectare of corn, while 2,000 gallons of ethanol (second gen) 
can be produced from ligno-cellulosic biomass (Khanna 2008). In EU, around 1,000 gallons/ha 
can be obtained from BTL, but only 400 gallons/ha are obtained from first gen biofuels. 
Second gen fuels are more costly to produce. The processing cost of cellulosic ethanol is $3.00 
per gallon while first gen corn ethanol currently costs about $1.01 per gallon and ethanol from 
sugar cane costs $0.94.
32
 The processing cost of BTL diesel is $3.35 per gallon - twice that of 
first gen biodiesel. However, technological progress is expected to gradually narrow these cost 
differentials and by about 2030, the per gallon processing costs of second gen biofuels and BTL 
diesel are projected to be $1.09 and $1.40, respectively.
33
 Finally, second gen fuels enjoy a 
subsidy of $1.01 per gallon in the US (Tyner 2012), which is also accounted for in the model. 
 
US and EU mandates. The US mandate sets the domestic target for biofuels at nine billion 
gallons annually by 2008, increasing to 36 billion gallons by 2022.
34
 The bill specifies the use of 
first and second gen biofuels (respectively, corn ethanol and advanced biofuels) as shown in 
Figure 3. The former is scheduled to increase steadily from the current annual level of 11 to 15 
billion gallons by 2015. The bill requires an increase in the consumption of “advanced” biofuels 
(or second generation biofuels) from near zero to 21 billion gallons per year in 2022. In the EU, 
                                                 
32
 For second generation biofuels, processing is more costly than for first-generation biofuels and production costs 
plus land rent account for about 65% of the total cost. 
33
 Second generation biofuels costs are assumed to decrease by 2% per year. All data on production costs are from 
IEA (2009b). 
34
 It is not clear whether the mandates will be imposed beyond 2022 but in our model, we assume that they will be 
extended until 2050. In fact ethanol use in the US has already hit the 10% “blending wall” imposed by Clean Air 
regulations which must be relaxed for further increases in biofuel consumption. We abstract from distinguishing 
between the three categories of advanced biofuels in the US mandate. Of the 21 billion of second gen biofuels 
mandated, 4 billion gallons are low emission biofuels that can be met by biofuels other than cellulosic, such as 
sugarcane ethanol imported from Brazil. Another billion gallons may be met by biodiesel, which is used mainly for 
trucks. In this study, we assume that the entire target for advanced biofuels has to be met by cellulosic ethanol. 
20 
 
the mandate requires a minimum biofuels share of 10% in transport fuel by 2020. Unlike the US, 
the EU has no regulation on the use of second gen fuels. 
                                 
  Figure 3. US biofuel mandate 
 
Carbon emissions. The model accounts for direct carbon emissions from fossil fuel consumption 
in transportation and indirect carbon emissions induced by the conversion of new land into 
agriculture. Carbon from biofuel use is mainly emitted during production and hence is crop-
specific. Considering only direct emissions, displacing gasoline by corn ethanol reduces 
emissions by 35%; 70% if displaced by ethanol from sugarcane. Second-generation biofuels 
reduce carbon by 80% compared to gasoline (Chen et al. 2012).
35
 Conversion of land for farming 
also releases carbon into the atmosphere.
36
 Using Searchinger et al. (2008), we assume that the 
carbon released is 300 and 500 tons of CO2e (CO2 equivalent) per hectare respectively for 
medium and low quality land, immediately after land conversion. This is because medium quality 
land has more pasture and less forests than low quality land, and pastures emit less carbon.
37
 
                                                 
35
 Carbon emissions from gasoline and representative biofuels are reported in the Appendix (Table A12). 
36
 This is a gradual process. For forests, it may also depend on the final use of forest products. However, we assume 
that all carbon is released immediately following land-use change, an assumption also made in other well-known 
studies (e.g., Searchinger, et al. 2008).  
37
 There have been recent studies (see Hertel et al., 2010) which suggest that the emissions from indirect land use 
change are likely to be somewhat smaller than those assumed by Searchinger. However, given that significant land 
use change occurs both in our base model and the one under regulation, these new estimates are unlikely to affect the 
central conclusions of our paper. Emission levels may change, not the net effect of biofuel regulation.   
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Trade among regions. Although we assume frictionless trading in crude oil and food 
commodities between countries, in reality, there are significant trade barriers in agriculture, but 
given the level of aggregation in our model, it is difficult to model agricultural tariffs, which are 
mostly commodity-specific (sugar, wheat, etc.). However, we do model US and EU tariffs on 
biofuels. The US ethanol policy includes a per-unit tariff of $0.54 per gallon and a 2.5% ad 
valorem tariff (Yacobucci and Schnepf, 2007). The EU specifies a 6.5% ad valorem tariff on 
biofuel imports (Kojima et al. 2007). After 2012, US trade tariffs are removed from the model to 
match current policy (The Economist, 2012).  
 
The discount rate is assumed to be 2% as is standard in such analyses (Nordhaus and Boyer 
2000). We simulate the model over 200 years (2007-2207) in steps of five, to keep the runs 
tractable. It is calibrated for the base year 2007. The theoretical framework is defined as an 
infinite horizon problem. However, for tractability, we use a finite approximation in the form of a 
long time horizon (2007-2207) to ensure that the dynamic rent of oil is positive. This does not 
really affect the period we are mainly interested in, which is roughly the next decade. We follow 
Sohngen and Mendelsohn (2003) by assuming that exogenous parameters like population and 
income do not change significantly after 2100.  
 
Model validation. It is not possible to test model predictions over a long time horizon because 
biofuel mandates have been imposed only recently. However, as shown in Fig.4, the model does 
track the US gasoline consumption quite closely from 2000 to 2007.
38
 The average difference 
between observed and projected values is systematically around 3%. The model predicts the 
                                                 
38
 Note that we only impose biofuel mandates in our model so the gasoline consumption is determined 
endogenously.                          
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annual average increase in food prices from 2000 to 2013 at 9%.
39
 According to the FAO, food 
prices grew at an annual rate of 7.5% during this period. The model solution suggests that around 
19 million hectares of new land are converted for farming from 2000 to 2009. According to 
FAOSTAT, 21 million hectares of land were brought into cultivation during this period. These 
indicators suggest that the model performs reasonably well in predicting the impact of the 
mandates on different variables of interest. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Model prediction vs actual US oil consumption from 2000 to 2013 
Source: Consumption figures are from EIA (2014). Notes: The difference between observed and predicted values is 
higher after 2008 since US gasoline consumption fell during the recession 2008-2013. Of course, our partial 
equilibrium model does not capture short-run macro-economic fluctuations.  
 
 
IV. Simulation Results 
 
We first state the scenarios modeled in the paper and then describe the results. In the Baseline 
case (model BASE), we assume that there are no energy mandates and both first and second gen 
fuels are available. This is the unconstrained model described before and serves as the 
counterfactual. The idea is to see how substitution into biofuels takes place in the absence of any 
                                                 
39
 Our world food price is the average of cereal and meat prices weighted by the share of each commodity in total 
food consumption. In general, it is hard to accurately predict food prices in the short run, because of weather-related 
variability (droughts such as the one that occurred in Australia in 2008 or Russia in 2010), currency fluctuations and 
other macroeconomic phenomena.  
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clean energy regulation. In the Regulatory Scenario (model REG), US/EU mandatory blending 
policies, as described earlier, are imposed. The key results are as follows:
40
  
 
Effect of biofuel mandates on food prices. We find that the effect of the mandates on food prices 
is significant, but not huge (see REG in Table 4). With no energy mandates, food prices rise by 
about 15%, which is purely from changes in population and consumption patterns (see BASE).
 41
 
With energy mandates, they go up by 32% (see REG). Thus, the additional increase in 2022 from 
energy regulation is about 17%.
42
 This is much smaller than what most other studies predict 
(Rosegrant et al. 2008, Roberts and Schlenker 2012).
43
  
Table 4. World food, biofuel and gasoline prices (in 2007 Dollars) 
  BASE REG 
Weighted food price
 
($/ton) 
     2007 557 564 
     2022           639 (15%)               746 (32%) 
Biofuel price 
($/gallon) 
2007 
2022 
  2.14  
  1.97 
2.18 
2.19 
Crude oil price 
($/barrel) 
2007 105 106 
2022 121 119 
Notes: Weighted food price is the average of cereal and meat prices weighted by the share of each 
commodity in total food consumption. The numbers in brackets represent the percentage change in prices 
between 2007 and 2022. Our predictions for crude oil prices are quite close to the US Department of 
Energy (EIA 2010, p.28) reference projection of $115/barrel in 2022: see their ‘High and Low Oil Price’ 
range.  
 
                                                 
40
 Our results are time sensitive but to streamline the discussion, we mostly focus on the year 2022. In the more 
distant future (say around 2050 and beyond), rising energy prices and a slowdown in demand growth makes biofuels 
economical, even without any supporting mandates. Mandates become somewhat redundant by then. Given the lack 
of space, we do not discuss what happens in 2050 and beyond. 
41
 The model is calibrated to track real food prices in 2007. Cereal and meat prices for that year for the BASE case 
are $218 and $1,964 per ton. Observed prices in 2007 were $250 and $2,262, respectively (World Bank 2010). The 
small difference can be explained by our calibration method, which is based on quantities not prices.  
42
 Since the model is dynamic, the initial values are endogenous, hence the starting prices in 2007 are not exactly 
equal (Table 4).  
43
 In general, it is difficult to compare outcomes from different models, but Rosegrant et al. (2008) predict prices of 
specific crops such as oilseeds, maize and sugar rising by 20-70% in 2020, which are generally much higher than in 
our case. Roberts and Schlenker (2013) project that 5% of world caloric production would be used for ethanol 
production due to the US mandate. As a result, world food prices in their model rise by 30%. These studies assume 
energy equivalence between gasoline and biofuels, i.e., one gallon of gasoline is equivalent to one gallon of biofuel. 
We account for the fact that one gallon of ethanol yields about a third less energy than gasoline, as in Chen et al. 
(2012). 
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Figure 5 shows the time trend in food prices under the two regimes. Note that prices increase 
both with and without regulation.
44
 The substantial increase in food demand in MICs and LICs  
accompanied by a change in dietary preferences raises the demand for land, which drives up its 
opportunity cost. Without energy regulation, meat consumption in these two regions increases by 
8% (for MICs) and 34% (for LICs) between 2007 and 2022, with the latter starting from a 
smaller base. The consumption of cereals remains stable. Since more land is used per kilogram of 
meat produced, the overall effect is increased pressure on land. Food prices decline over time as 
the effect of the mandates wear off.
45
 This is mainly because population growth levels off and 
yields increase due to technological improvements in agriculture. 
 
Demand growth causes most of the land conversion, nearly all of it in developing countries. 
Table 5 shows that the really big increases in land use occur even without mandates: in the MICs, 
119 million ha (=912-793) are brought under production between 2007 and 2022 without any  
 
Figure 5. World weighted food prices 
Notes: The baseline model is in blue and the regulated model in red. The weighted food price is the average of cereal 
and meat prices weighted by the share of each commodity in total food consumption. 
 
                                                 
44
 Although real food prices have declined in the past four decades, the potential for both acreage expansion and 
intensification of agriculture through improved technologies is expected to be lower than in the past (Ruttan 2002). 
From 1960 to 2000, crop yields have more than doubled (FAO 2003). However, over the next five decades, yields 
are expected to increase by only about 50%, see data presented in Appendix (Table A5). However, yields may also 
respond to higher food prices, an effect we do not capture here. That will imply a smaller impact of energy mandates 
on food prices. 
45
 The increase in price due to regulation is about 6% in the year 2100. 
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mandates (see BASE). This is about two thirds of all the cultivated land currently in production 
in the US. No new land (including land available under the US Conservation Reserve Program is 
brought under cultivation in the US due to higher conversion costs than in MICs. With the 
mandates, MICs bring another 74 (=986-912) million hectares under farming. Food production in 
the US/EU declines but rises in the MICs. Overall, the mandates increase aggregate land area in 
agriculture, because of conversion of new land.  
Table 5. Land allocation to food and energy production (in million ha) 
  US EU MICs 
  BASE REG BASE REG BASE REG 
Land under food 
production 
 
2007 166 167    138      136    789      789 
2022 166     107 137      129    905        980 
Land under  
biofuel production 
 
2007         12       11       5          7     4     4  
2022         12       71    6        14      7            6 
Total 
cultivated land 
 
2007 178 178 143   143 793 793 
2022 178 178 143   143 912 986 
Notes: Land allocation in Other HICs and LICs are similar across the two models. 
 
 
 
 
Fig.6 shows land use for food and fuel. Note that in the US about 60 million ha – a third of all 
farmland – is moved from food to fuel production, but no new land is added (Fig.6a).46 However, 
the MICs convert a significant amount of land, irrespective of the energy mandates (Fig.6b).
47
 
Both first and second gen biofuel production increases sharply under the US mandate. US food 
production declines by almost 27% as a result of the energy mandates (not shown). US food 
exports go down by more than 80% (from 75 to 13 million tons). This is because land is shifted 
out of food to produce biofuels for domestic consumption. Imports of first gen biofuels more than 
double.  
                                                 
46
 It is important to note that there are other sources of second gen biofuels that are less land-consuming, such as corn 
stower and forest products, which can affect these land conversion estimates significantly. They may lead to a lower 
rise in food prices than predicted in the paper. 
47
 We do not show the EU case because the change in acreage is small. 
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Fig. 6(a). Land allocation in US: land is shifted 
out from food to fuel 
              Fig. 6(b) Land conversion in MICs 
Figure 6. Land allocation under Base and REG (year 2022) 
Note: An area larger than current US farmland is cleared in the MICs but most of it is due to demand growth not 
biofuel policy 
 
Mandates lead to big increases in biofuel production, earlier in time. Without regulation, biofuel 
consumption in the EU and US in 2022 is around 2 and 8 billion gallons, and accounts for  
3% and 5.5% of fuel consumption, respectively. This is much lower than what is prescribed by 
the mandates. Fig.7 shows consumption with and without the mandates (BASE, REG). The 
mandatory blending policy requires an additional 30 billion gallons of biofuels in 2022 compared 
to the unregulated case, mostly in the US.
48 
The US target is much more ambitious than the EU 
target. It binds until 2040 (see panels a and b), and yields a bigger gap in consumption with and 
without the mandate than in the EU.  
As seen from Fig. 7(a) and 7(c), first gen fuels decline in use without a mandate for several years 
before becoming economical in response to rising energy prices. After 2030, their use increases 
even without a mandate. In the absence of regulation, the global share of oil in transport steadily 
decreases from 95% in 2007 to 84% in 2050. The share of biofuels increases, mainly due to an 
                                                 
48
 Global biofuels production under the baseline scenario is 18 billion gallons in 2022. 
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increase in the market share of first gen fuels. With no regulation, second gen biofuels are not 
economically viable by 2022 in the US whereas they are adopted by 2017 in the EU. This is due  
to lower unit costs in the EU. The production of first gen fuels, however, does show a more rapid 
growth after 2030, mainly because of a reduced demand for land (see Fig.7a and 7c). 
 
 
          Fig. 7(a) US first gen biofuel use                          Fig. 7(b) US second gen biofuel us 
 
Fig. 7(c) Share of biofuels in transport in EU 
 
Figure 7. US and EU biofuel use (with and without mandates) 
Note: The EU mandate is defined as a share.  
 
With no regulation, annual world production of biofuels is constant at about 20 billion gallons 
until 2020, before increasing to 96 billion in 2050 (not shown).49 The stagnation until 2020 is due 
to a rapid increase in the opportunity cost of land, caused by the growing demand for food. 
Indeed, land rents double in the US and EU during this period. Beyond 2020 however, food 
                                                 
49
 Although the first gen biofuels consumption goes beyond that in REG as shown in Fig 7(a), the total consumption 
of biofuels (sum of first-and-second gen biofuels) is larger under the REG. Under the BASE scenario, the 
consumption of second gen biofuels is nil since they are not competitive.  
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demand levels off, and so do land rents. The scarcity rent of oil continues to increase, making 
gasoline more expensive and biofuels economically feasible (Fig. 7).   
 
Mandates reduce crude oil prices and cause significant leakage and direct emissions. The 
primary goal of biofuel regulation is to reduce direct emissions from the energy sector. US 
emissions fall by less than 1% and EU emissions by about 1.5% (see Table 6). 
50
 The switch 
towards less carbon intensive energy is partially offset by the rise in the demand for the blended 
fuel. The mandates, while increasing the consumption of biofuels in the US/EU, increase oil 
consumption and reduce biofuel use elsewhere. This occurs because of terms of trade effects – 
the mandate lowers the world price of oil (see Table 4). In 2022 the price of oil is about 1% 
lower, while the price of biofuels increases by 11% with mandatory blending. The net effect is 
that biofuel consumption outside the US and EU goes down by 20% in 2022, most of it in MIC 
countries. Oil use in the rest of the world goes up by 1%.
51
  
Table 6. Direct carbon emissions in billion tons of CO2e (REG) 
 US EU World 
2007 1.85 0.83 5.1 
2022 1.95 (-0.9%) 0.81(-1.5%) 6.30 (-0.5%) 
Note: We compute carbon emissions in terms of CO2e (CO2 equivalent), which includes other greenhouse gases 
such as nitrogen dioxide and methane. Numbers in parenthesis represent the percentage change of carbon 
emissions compared to BASE model, which is not shown.  
 
Globally, annual direct emissions of carbon decrease by about 0.5%. Although the US/EU 
consume a significant share of global transportation energy - 53% in 2007, which declines to 
28% in 2050 – the decline in emissions in these two regions is mostly offset by spatial leakage. 
The net effect of mandatory blending policies on global direct emissions is small (Table 6).  
                                                 
50
 Observed average carbon emissions for previous years are close to our model predictions. The former are 1.7, 0.9 
and 5.8 tons of CO2e for the US, EU and World in 2007, very similar to our base figures shown in Table (IEA, 
2009c).  
51
 We only discuss spatial leakage while other models have studied inter-temporal leakage (e.g., see Fischer and 
Salant, 2011) and inter-sectoral leakage (Fullerton and Heutel, 2010).  
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Indirect carbon emissions increase. Biofuel mandates lead to an increase in indirect global 
emissions (see Fig.8). The mandates increase total emissions in most years relative to the 
unregulated (BASE) case, which to a large degree is due to land conversion. Total emissions 
(direct and indirect) also increase in the near term (see Fig.8). Since we track the amount and 
quality of land that is converted for agriculture, we can compute indirect emissions from land use. 
Regardless of whether biofuel mandates are imposed in our model, the increased demand for food 
and energy causes large-scale land conversion. The mandates only accelerate this process. In 
2022, indirect carbon emissions increase by 60% (or 4.4 billion tons of CO2e), all of it from non-
regulated countries, which is much larger than the annual savings from regulation in the 
mandated countries (0.01 billion tons). In aggregate, carbon emissions increase by about 4.4 
billion tons of CO2e due to mandatory blending (see Fig. 8).  
 
Figure 8. Biofuel mandates do not reduce carbon emissions 
Notes: Shown for 2022. Total emissions are the sum of direct and indirect emissions. 
 
Welfare declines in the non-regulated countries. We compute the regional gains and losses in 
aggregate consumer and producer surplus for the food and energy commodities as a result of the 
mandates. Medium and low-income countries experience the largest loss in welfare with 
mandatory blending. However, the US experiences a slight increase in welfare. These results are 
primarily driven by changes in surplus from agriculture. The mandates increase biofuel 
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production, which causes an increase in the opportunity cost of land, which in turn drives up the 
price of agricultural commodities (both food and energy). This has a significant positive impact 
on surplus in the US agricultural sector, which is one of the stated goals of the mandate (see de 
Gorter and Just 2010).  
 
Since we do not explicitly account for externalities, the global welfare effect of introducing 
mandatory blending is negative – welfare declines when the model is constrained. In the MICs 
and LICs - countries where a large share of income is allocated to food consumption - consumers 
are more sensitive to changes in food prices. As a result, the loss in welfare of food consumers 
exceeds the gain to food producers (from higher food prices). Note however, that we do not 
include the benefits from reduced carbon emissions in the mandated nations or elsewhere, which 
are likely to be significant because carbon is a global pollutant. On the other hand, higher 
emissions in other nations due to terms of trade effects will cause environmental damages and 
will likely decrease aggregate welfare.  
 
V. Sensitivity Analysis 
There is uncertainty regarding the values of several key parameters used in the empirical analysis. 
These include the stock of oil and its cost of extraction, the conversion cost of fallow land and 
yield parameters for crops. In this section, we investigate the sensitivity of our results to changes 
in these parameters.
52
 We also impose biofuel mandates in two of the largest energy consuming 
nations, China and India, to check how food prices may be impacted if they too implement their 
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 Because of a lack of space, we are unable to show all our sensitivity results. We discuss only the most significant 
ones.  
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announced mandates. Finally, we check how assumptions regarding the scarcity of crude oil, the 
interest rate and income-based dietary preferences affect our analysis. 
 
Model Sensitivity to Parameter Values. Our strategy is to shock both models (REG and BASE) 
with the following changes: (1) 50% lower conversion cost for fallow lands, (2) 50% increase in 
oil stock and (3) a 10% increase in agricultural yields because of adoption of biotechnology.
53
 
Land conversion costs are important because they represent a situation in which governments 
may relax regulatory policies or subsidize conversion of land into agriculture. We consider the 
case of abundant oil, in response to the fact that historically, reserve estimates have been biased 
downwards.
54
 For (3), we model the adoption of genetically modified foods that may raise 
agricultural yields through introduction of new cropping varieties that are plant and disease 
resistant and do well in arid environments (FAO 2008b).
55
 We assume a reasonable across-the-
board increase in agricultural yields of 10% relative to the models described earlier.
56
 To keep it 
simple, this increase in yields is assumed uniform across land qualities and regions and affects 
production of food and biofuels. 
 
Table 7 reports the percent change in the outcome variables under REG relative to BASE when 
specific parameters are changed. We are interested in changes in the difference between the two 
                                                 
53
 An increase in the cost of extraction of oil is not considered, but would have a similar effect as a reduction in the 
initial stock of oil since both would raise energy prices. Preliminary runs suggest that the model is not sensitive to the 
cost of extraction.  
54
 For example, recent discoveries of cheap shale oil and gas have made biofuels less economically attractive, 
according to the IEA (IEA, 2013). 
55
 The adoption of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) can help biofuel production by increasing the 
production of biomass per unit of land as well as the conversion of biomass to first or second gen biofuels (FAO 
2008b).   
56
 According to the Council of Biotechnology Information (2008), adoption of GMOs contributed to a 15% increase 
in US crop yields during 2002-07. Due to a lack of data for other countries, we apply this rate of increase across the 
board.    
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models, i.e., for any given row, column entries that deviate significantly from the first column. 
For instance, when the cost of land conversion declines, food price increases are smaller, which is 
intuitive. More land will be converted and hence the impact on the food market is lower. With 
abundant oil, the price of oil is lower, making biofuels less competitive even in the base model. 
Thus, the net effect of regulation is larger on food prices, than with the initial parameters. This 
leads to a larger decrease in direct emissions in the regulated regions (US and EU). Finally, 
higher adoption of biotech leads to less land conversion in the BASE model (by about 50%) so 
that when the mandate is imposed, the additional land conversion is significant, and we get a 
large impact on indirect carbon emissions.
57
 
Table 7. Sensitivity analysis: Percentage change of key variables in REG relative to BASE 
(year 2022) 
 
Initial 
Parameter 
Values 
(1) Lower land 
conversion cost 
(2) Higher 
Oil Stock 
(3) Higher Adoption 
of Biotech 
Food price  17 14.1        22 11.84 
Biofuel price  10 8.6 30 8.1 
Gasoline price -1 -1.4 -1.5 -1.1 
US food exports -82 -85 -84 -61 
      US biofuel imports  89 66 150 15 
             Aggr. acreage 4 4.5 4.38 4.9 
Direct 
emissions 
US  -1 -0.5 -3 -1.9 
EU -2 -1.15 -0.63 1 
World -1 -0.3 0.65 -1.2 
Indirect emissions 61 42 61 169 
Total emissions 32 27 30 51 
Note: All figures are percent changes in the variable in the REG model over the BASE model 
 
EU, Chinese and Indian Mandates, Scarcity of Oil and Stationary Dietary Preferences. Before 
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 It may be useful to comment on how the BASE model (the one without regulation) itself responds to changes in 
the above parameters. The most important observation is that when the conversion cost of new land decreases, direct 
emissions decline, because more biofuel is used. Less food is consumed but greater biofuel use leads to more land 
conversion. Other factors have similar qualitative effects on the model without regulation, but less in magnitude. 
Detailed results for this case are not shown but can be obtained from the authors.  
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examining the effects of Chinese and Indian mandates, we investigate the effects of the EU 
mandate without the US policy. Since EU transport fuel consumption is about half that of the US, 
the former has a small effect on prices. The increase in food price is only 1.5%. World direct 
carbon emissions are almost constant (-0.11%) under the only EU policy, while EU emissions go 
down by 1.2%. The additional land area required to meet the EU target is smaller and indirect 
carbon emissions increase by 9%.
58
 Now consider the case of China and India, the two most 
populous countries, imposing domestic biofuel mandates.
59
 We assume that these two nations 
impose a mandate requiring the share of biofuels in transportation to rise linearly to at least 10% 
by 2022. Imposing these mandates increases biofuel consumption in the MICs from 10 billion 
gallons under REG to 24 billion.
60
 However, terms of trade effects are smaller in this case 
because these two large countries use more biofuels. Global oil consumption goes down by less 
than 1%, with little change in direct carbon emissions in the MICs. What is interesting is that 
instead of moving land away from food to fuel production, farmers from MICs, which are land 
abundant, bring new land under cultivation (another 10 million hectares). As a result, indirect 
emissions rise to 13 million tons. Still, world food prices rise by only 1% beyond the impacts 
from US and EU mandates.  
 
We estimate the effects of three other key assumptions in the model. First, we suppose that the 
price of oil remains constant over the entire period at $105/barrel, the initial crude oil price in our 
                                                 
58
 It may be of interest to deduce from our model how the EU mandate affects prices and emissions, given the US 
mandate. We can compare a case in which only the US mandate is imposed and then compare the outcome with REG 
in which both mandates are in effect. Since EU gasoline consumption is about half of the US, the change in biofuel 
consumption is small, which reduces the impact of the EU mandate. The increase in food price is about 2%. World 
direct carbon emissions are almost constant (-0.17%), and the indirect carbon emissions only increase by 9%. 
59
 The number of vehicles in China is expected to increase from 30 to 225 million by the year 2025, and in India 
from 15 to 125 million (IEA 2009a). Currently, biofuels supply less than 1% of transportation fuel in these countries.  
60
 Here China and India are still modeled as part of the group of MICs. To calculate the minimum biofuel standard 
that meets the China-India target, we get gasoline consumption projections from the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA 2013). 
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model. Without a mandate, world use of biofuels decreases because of constant oil prices. US 
biofuel use drops from 8 to 2 billion gallons in 2022, and second gen fuels are never adopted. 
With the mandate, indirect carbon emissions increase by about 60% compared to the BASE 
model (both with cheap oil). About 85 million hectares of new land are brought under cultivation 
because of energy regulation. This is 10 million hectares more than when oil prices rise due to 
scarcity. With cheap oil, biofuel use is low without mandates and increases sharply with them. 
Now, imposing the mandate has a bigger effect on food prices, which increase by 30%. Recall 
that food prices increased by about 17% when oil prices were allowed to increase due to scarcity. 
The mandates induce higher land conversion to energy and less to food. The subsidy required to 
meet the US targets is almost 1.5 times larger than under the REG model.  
 
We also examine the sensitivity of the outcome variables to a change in the social discount rate 
from 2 to 5 percent. A rise in the discount rate leads to a faster extraction of the oil stock. 
Therefore, one would expect biofuel consumption to decline in the BASE case. Indeed, it 
decreases from 9 to 4 billion gallons in 2022. Regulated first gen biofuel use is the same under 
both discount rates, equal to 15 billion gallons. As a result, world food prices increase by 21% 
due to adoption of the US biofuel mandate (compared to BASE) instead of 17% in the base case. 
A higher discount rate means a lower oil price, which actually increases domestic emissions in 
the US, as well as global emissions due to leakage, by a few percentage points.  
 
To see the effect on food prices if no second gen mandate was specified in the US, we do a model 
run in which both first and second gen biofuels can be used to meet mandatory blending 
specifications, but there is no requirement on the share of second gen fuels. We find that second 
gen fuels are too costly and will not be produced without a mandate. With the mandate, 21 billion 
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gallons are produced. Without mandates on second generation biofuels, food prices in 2022 go up 
by 40% from the base year 2007: in that case land-using first gen fuels supply most of the 
biofuel. One may expect more food to be produced when second gen fuels which are less land-
intensive, are mandated. However, land rents decline, and US food exports double under second 
gen fuels, albeit from a low base. In summary, the mandate on second gen biofuels helps reduce 
imports, but does not release land for more food production in the US since second generation 
biofuels are domestically produced. 
 
Finally, we examine what happens when food preferences are assumed constant, i.e., there is no 
income-driven preference for meat and dairy products. We fix income elasticities for meat and 
cereal in the MICs and LICs at levels similar to the US and EU. This means that people in 
developing countries are assumed to have the same elasticities towards meat and cereals as in 
developed nations, but at their lower consumption levels. As a result, their meat consumption 
increases far less rapidly with income than before. To compare, note that per capita meat 
consumption goes up by 8% in MICs and by 34% in LICs from 2007 to 2022 when preferences 
change exogenously as in the previous runs. With stationary preferences, meat consumption is 
almost constant. Food prices decrease by about 9% in the same period, compared to a 15% 
increase in the BASE model (see Table 4). Since land rents fall, more biofuels are produced. For 
instance in the US, an additional five billion gallons are produced compared to the BASE case, 
reaching 11 billion gallons in 2022. Food prices are higher under regulation by 7% compared to 
no regulation, when preferences are assumed stationary. To meet their biofuel targets, the US and 
EU import less biofuels from MIC countries. MIC nations, in turn, convert less land to farming.
61
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 We also do a sensitivity run with a higher elasticity of substitution (doubling the base value). This assumption may 
be realistic if the vehicle fleet is mainly composed of Flex Fuel Vehicles. Biofuel consumption is lower than in the 
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VI. Concluding Remarks 
We model the dynamic effects of biofuel mandates in the US and EU by combining three 
elements, which have not been considered together in previous studies - income-driven dietary 
preferences, differences in land quality and a limited endowment of oil. We find that modeling 
land supply leads to price impacts of the energy mandates that are generally lower than in most 
studies. Secondly, demand side effects that include expected changes in dietary preferences 
account for half of these price effects, the remaining coming from mandates. Third, even 
mandates adopted by big developing countries China and India do not produce large price effects, 
although more land is converted into farming. 
 
Our results suggest that dietary changes towards increased meat and dairy consumption may have 
an important role in the projected growth of food prices. For example, if diets were kept constant, 
food prices would actually fall over time (9%) without energy regulation, and with biofuel 
mandates, they will rise by only 7% in year 2022, less than what other studies predict. The upshot 
of these results is that the effect of energy policies that divert corn from food to fuel can be 
mitigated by supply side adjustments such as land conversion. However, indirect carbon 
emissions will be significant, leading to no net reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, one of the 
primary stated goals of biofuel policy. In fact, annual aggregate emissions are almost invariant 
with respect to assumptions about the crude oil market. If crude oil supplies are assumed scarce, 
more biofuels are used, leading to low direct emissions but high indirect emissions from land 
conversion. If crude oil is assumed abundant, less biofuel is used, causing high direct emissions 
                                                                                                                                                              
model with initial parameters. Hence, the increase in biofuel production required to meet the biofuel target is higher 
than under a lower elasticity of substitution. The net effect of biofuel policy is significant - food prices increase by 
24%. 
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and low indirect emissions. Thus, biofuel mandates may not reduce aggregate emissions, unless 
new technologies such as genetically modified crops are widely used.  
 
The model is simple and can be extended in many directions. The general equilibrium effects of 
the energy mandate are not studied. For example, converting new land into farming may induce 
labor migration into these areas, which may in turn shift the regional demand curves for food and 
energy. Alternatively, energy price changes may trigger technological change, which may further 
reduce the impacts of regulation. For instance, high fuel prices may lead to the increased adoption 
of fuel-efficient cars and reduce fuel use, including biofuels. Higher meat prices may lead to 
changes in the livestock industry, such as a shift from ranching to intensive feedlot operations, 
which will mitigate the effect of food price shocks. Learning effects, that are a result of market 
share, especially for new technologies like second generation biofuels, may also be quite 
significant. Finally, it is not clear how other countries will react to the mandates in choosing their 
own energy and agricultural policies. Strategic interactions could be modeled explicitly in future 
work. Increases in food prices, whether from demand effects or energy policies, may lead to 
increased efficiency in agriculture, through irrigation, better seeds and other inputs. Our model 
assumes exogenous rates of technological change, not linked to prices. Price effects may further 
strengthen the supply response discussed in the paper.  
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